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Competing Explanations for Parallel Conduct:
Lessons from the Australian Detergent Case (Colgate-Palmolive)
George A Hay and E Jane Murdoch1
I.

Introduction

Parallel conduct by competing firms is an almost unavoidable phenomenon in the real world. Of course,
parallel conduct can be the result of completely independent and uncontroversial behaviour, such as
when all suppliers are affected by and respond unilaterally to an identical increase in costs. Few would
suggest that, in such circumstances, the firms’ conduct should be subject to sanctions. At the other
extreme, parallel conduct can be the result of interdependent and deliberately coordinated behaviour,
such as when all suppliers meet in the proverbial smoke-filled room and agree to fix prices. Few would
hesitate to condemn such conduct under antitrust law or competition policy. But as economists have
been telling us for decades, there is a vast middle ground, where the parallel conduct stems from some
degree of interdependence and some behaviour short of the hard-core cartel described above. This is
especially likely to be the case when the industry is relatively concentrated or oligopolistic in structure
and firms have a history of interacting in the marketplace. Understanding the reasons for the parallel
behaviour and deciding what to do about it is a central element of modern antitrust law and policy.
New forces at work will increase the challenge of distinguishing acceptable and unacceptable parallel
conduct. For example, the likely effect of the 2017 revisions to Australia’s Competition and Consumer
Act that were intended to increase deterrence of coordinated behaviour will be to bring additional
behaviour under antitrust scrutiny and may broaden the grey area of what is permitted and what is not.
In addition, use of artificial intelligence such as algorithmic models used in decision making may
reinforce interdependence among firms and thus introduce new sources of coordinated behaviour to be
evaluated through an antitrust lens. At the end of the day, an understanding of how interdependence
and conduct interact will be an essential part of the exercise. This paper is intended to assist in
understanding that interaction.
Under the competition laws of both Australia and the United States, price fixing and related
“agreements” among competitors are generally unlawful, and the same is true among the vast majority
of nations that have competition laws.2 Moreover, over time there has generally been a consensus that
such agreements should be unlawful; that is, the law gets it right as a matter of public policy. But the
tricky operational problem is in defining exactly what counts as an “agreement” and what evidence can
be relied on to establish the existence of one.
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We are using “agreement” in this paragraph as a placeholder. In what follows we try to spell out more precisely
the kinds of horizontal cooperation that may have been unlawful according to the law in place at the time of the
laundry detergent events. We briefly discuss the impact of the new concerted practices law toward the end of this
paper.
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Ironically, in the United States, the word “agreement” does not appear in the relevant statute at all.
Rather Section 1 of the Sherman Act refers to “contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy” in restraint of trade or commerce, and contains no definition of those terms or examples
of what they mean. Indeed, US courts have rarely if ever attempted to distinguish among contract,
combination and conspiracy, and generations of antitrust lawyers have grown used to the shorthand
version of the statute to the effect that “agreements in restraint of trade” are unlawful. But the
operational problem remains the same: what do we mean by agreement and how do we prove there is
one?
The situation in Australia is slightly more nuanced. The statute as it existed prior to the 2010 revision
referred to “contracts, arrangements, or understandings,” and unlike the situation in the US, Australian
courts have attempted to distinguish among those three terms, with “contracts” being seen as the most
formal of the three and “understandings” as the least formal. Nevertheless, the operational problem in
Australia has been similar: what conduct rises at least to the level of an understanding, and how do we
prove that such an understanding (or arrangement or contract) exists? The addition of “concerted
practices” to the Australian equivalent of the Sherman Act in 2010 will affect where the line is drawn but
the guidance offered for the new law is vague, pointing to behaviour likely to promote cooperation in
the place of competition. One might reasonably ask, what degree of cooperation and relative to what
degree of competition?
In both jurisdictions it is reasonably clear that, for the conduct to be covered, it need not rise to the level
of a legally binding contract, enforceable in a court of law. To hold otherwise would emasculate the law,
as few if any of the most blatant and anticompetitive cartels imaginable would be considered as
constituting a legally enforceable contract. But past that end point, the clarity dissipates and the most
challenging questions arise: a) how far from a legally enforceable contract can the conduct be and still
be covered; and b) what kind of evidence will permit a finding that the conduct does in fact satisfy the
legal standard for what is covered?
There are daunting questions about which much has been written in both countries.3 Our goal in this
paper is not to attempt to provide a definitive answer to these questions. Rather we hope to make
some incremental progress by coming at the problem from the other end, exploring, in the Australian
context, how a firm can escape the allegation that it has been a party to a contract, arrangement or
understanding even when its conduct in the marketplace appears to be roughly parallel to that of its
competitors. Our vehicle for this approach is the decision of the trial judge in the laundry detergent
case, upheld by the Full Federal Court, to dismiss the ACCC’s case against Cussons, the one producer of
detergent that actually went to trial, determining that the Commission had not succeeded in proving
that Cussons was a party to any collusive arrangement or understanding with its competitors (Colgate
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and Unilever) or with one of its major customers (Woolworths).4 It is our hope that an analysis of the
evidence in the case and the claims that were made (and either accepted or rejected) based on that
evidence will assist in framing the ongoing debate about where the boundary between lawful and
unlawful conduct lies (or should lie) and highlighting the kinds of economic evidence that advance the
debate. While we think the outcome of the debate will be affected by the changes in the language of the
governing law (such as the inclusion of “concerted practices”) and by developments in how firms
interact in the real world (such as competing firms’ use of artificial intelligence to guide strategic
decisions), understanding interdependence and how it interacts with behaviour will be a necessary part
of the process.
II.

Allegations and Prima Facie Evidence
The alleged collusive arrangement or understanding

In March 2009 “standard” powder laundry detergent manufactured by the three largest suppliers in
Australia, Unilever, Colgate, and Cussons, was removed from shelves of Woolworths and Coles grocery
stores and largely no longer supplied through Metcash, Australia’s major wholesaler to independent
grocery stores and was replaced with “2x concentrated” formulations.5 According to the ACCC’s
statement of claim, the major detergent suppliers and Woolworths reached an arrangement or
understanding between April 2008 and January 2009 to coordinate this largely simultaneous, discrete,
and thoroughgoing transition from standard to 2x concentrated (or “ultra”) detergent in March 2009.6
The ACCC made two similar but alternative claims about the nature of the arrangements between
detergent suppliers.7 The first alleged a Withhold Supply Arrangement, which was said to restrict the
supply of concentrated detergent before March 2009, to restrict the supply of standard detergent after
4
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Throughout the following discussion references are to powder detergent unless otherwise specified. Powder
laundry detergent accounted for roughly two thirds of total laundry detergent sales in Australia in the relevant
period. Detergent Case, [87]. In fact, the timing of the transition was not perfectly precise. Some 2x concentrated
Cussons products were available to Woolworths, Coles, and Metcash retail customers beginning in February 2009,
and Metcash continued buying a standard concentrate stock keeping unit from Cussons for some time after
February. Ibid, [373]-[374].
6

The original complaint brought by the ACCC was against Colgate, Cussons, and Woolworths. Unilever had
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7

The ACCC’s third allegation, that suppliers priced the new products at parity with the old product on a per-wash
basis, was eventually dropped from the proceedings.

3

March 2009, and to restrict the supply of concentrated detergent to products meeting particular
concentration levels, box sizes, on-pack communications, and the like.8 The second claim concerned an
Aligned Transition Arrangement, which alleged effectively the same anticompetitive behaviour, with
additional claims of anticompetitive purpose and effect or likely effect.9
Either alleged Arrangement would have had the effect of ensuring that Coles and Woolworths (the
major retailers) and Metcash (the wholesale supplier of independent and smaller chain grocery stores)
would not be offering both standard and concentrated detergent simultaneously. The Commission
alleged that in a world without the Arrangements, one or more of the suppliers would continue to
supply standard concentrate detergent.10 Thus, consumers would be faced with 2x concentrated boxes
that would be half the size of a wash load-equivalent standard concentrate detergent box but offered at
the same price. If some consumers failed to recognise that different-sized but equivalently-priced boxes
offered an equivalent number of washes, they would be drawn to purchase the larger boxes. This
customer confusion would cause suppliers to cut prices on the concentrated detergent to gain sales of
the lower-cost new product.11 Thus, according to the ACCC, a new source of price competition would be
injected by a non-uniform or staggered product transition, which, the Commission claimed, would surely
have occurred in the absence of an arrangement or understanding to coordinate the transition.12
The ACCC alleged that arrangements or understandings concerning the supply of detergent were
reached through a number of meetings and communications between the detergent suppliers and/or
through bilateral meetings between Woolworths and suppliers. At trial, the ACCC described hub-andspoke arrangements whereby first Accord, the Australasian industry association for laundry detergent
and other products, and then Woolworths communicated to each major supplier or facilitated
communication between the major suppliers such that each learned the plans of its competitors
concerning the timing of their product line transition and the new level of detergent concentration.13 In
its closing submission the ACCC referred to an alternative structure, involving a series of parallel vertical
arrangements between Woolworths and suppliers and a horizontal understanding among suppliers to
coordinate through this mechanism. This second alleged arrangement appears to have been
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distinguished from a hub-and-spoke structure by a more developed arrangement or understanding
among suppliers (a “horizontal arrangement”) to communicate and coordinate through Woolworths.14
There was no “smoking gun” evidence of an explicit agreement to coordinate behaviour. Therefore the
particular question before the judge at trial was whether the third supplier, Cussons, had entered into
any arrangement or understanding to participate in a coordinated transition to concentrated detergent.
Parallel behaviour occurred
There was no question that the major suppliers changed their product offerings in a strongly similar
manner and largely at the same time. In the week beginning May 9, 2009 Woolworths stores around
Australia introduced an almost complete array of “2x concentrated” or “ultra” powder detergent
supplied by Unilever, Colgate, and Cussons in place of the formerly available “standard” detergent from
each of these suppliers. A similar changeover began at Coles stores within a week.
Among the elements of parallel behaviour that were claimed by the ACCC at the outset, three were
largely undisputed: the major suppliers all concentrated their standard detergents by factor of 2x; the
changeover from standard to ultra powder detergents occurred (in very large part) in Woolworths and
Coles stores and in the Metcash wholesale supply chain in March 2009; and, the transition from the
supply of standard to 2x concentrated detergent was largely simultaneous and largely a complete
switchover.15
Of these three elements of parallel behaviour, the first appeared to be mainly an artefact of
technological limitations. For technical and production cost reasons, each supplier ultimately hit a limit
of 2x the concentration of its standard powder detergent.16 Cussons alone appeared to have considered
a choice between 2x concentrate and a weaker concentration of 1.5x, but concluded in a feasibility
study in early 2008 (well before the first Accord meeting or any communications from Woolworths
indicating what Cussons’ rivals were doing) that any non-integer change in concentration would be too
confusing for consumers.17 No supplier was able to achieve a workable 3x concentrated powder
detergent.18
Other elements of parallel behaviour claimed by the Commission, those describing certain marketing
details, were either not borne out or not established at trial. The suppliers did not adopt similar pack
sizes.19 The claim of prescribed parameters concerning advertising, communication and product claims
14
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In fact, there was evidence that some Woolworths, Coles and Metcash stores began selling some of Cussons’
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provisions of the sort alleged by the Commission.” Ibid, [606]. In addition, Cussons did continue to sell some
standard concentrates to Metcash after March 2009. Ibid, [374]. The judge considered this supply inconsistent
with the relevant provision of the alleged Withhold Supply Arrangements. Ibid, [632].
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on packaging received little attention at trial and the judge found no evidence of illegal coordination.20
And the allegation of parity pricing such that the wholesale list price per wash would be the same for
standard and 2x concentrated detergent packs offering the same number of washes ultimately was not
pressed.21
Thus, the two focal points of the trial were the single date for a transition, particularly as it moved from
an originally planned date three weeks earlier, and the fact that all suppliers abruptly and completely
cut over to supplying the new concentration and ceased offering the old.
III.

Laundry Detergent Supply
The economic incentives to supply concentrated laundry detergent

The context of the laundry detergent market in Australia and elsewhere in the world is important for
understanding actions taken by the market participants. By 2008, the retail market for laundry
detergent in Australia was mature and highly concentrated. The three largest suppliers, Unilever,
Colgate, and Cussons accounted for approximately 80 percent of detergent sales.22 The buying side of
the market was even more concentrated consisting mainly of Woolworths, Coles, and the wholesale
grocery supplier, Metcash. In 2008, more than half of detergent retail sales were made at promotional
or discounted prices.23 Supplier margins were thin and below corporate targets, in spite of the fact that
retailers subsidised promotional pricing for laundry detergent more than for many other products sold
in grocery stores. No party in the supply chain was getting rich selling detergent.24
By early 2008 oil prices denominated in US dollars were rising, and the cost increase in Australia was
exacerbated by a weakening Australian dollar. This trend was relevant to laundry detergent suppliers
because petroleum-based products were an important cost component of the filler in standard
concentration detergent. Compaction would reduce filler ingredients and was expected to lead to very
significant savings on inputs, packaging, storage, and logistic costs.
Each of the major detergent suppliers in Australia belonged to a global corporate family and was well
aware that transitions to 2x concentrated detergent had already occurred in Europe and the United
States. The move to more concentrated laundry detergent in Australia seemed inevitable, for cost and
environmental reasons. However, because each supplier produced its own array of branded products at
plants in Australia or New Zealand, it fell to the Australian suppliers to develop the science and
processes for compacting their detergents. Each supplier sought an integer change in concentration
that would be easy to communicate to consumers, whether 2x or 3x, and each supplier also aimed for its
scientists to formulate a new product that could be promoted to consumers as offering the same
20
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cleaning performance for a fraction of the detergent used. For reasons of technology and production
costs, each supplier ultimately hit a limit of 2x the concentration of standard detergent.
For retailers, the transition to concentrated detergent would mean significantly reduced transport,
handling, and storage costs and the freeing up of shelf space that could profitably be used for other
products or a larger display of the concentrated powdered detergents, with lower associated stocking
and “out of stock” costs. In addition, recognizing that detergent manufactures would realise important
cost savings, retailers looked for their own direct cost savings. For example, Woolworths informed the
suppliers that it expected to discontinue its past subsidization of promotional pricing events once
concentrated detergent was introduced.25 In this way, Woolworths expected to share directly in some
of the suppliers’ cost savings.
Prior transitions to concentrated detergent
By the time Australian detergent suppliers were considering compaction as a cost-reducing measure,
they could look to several past experiences of the introduction of reformulated detergent in various
markets. Powdered laundry detergent had, in fact, been concentrated once previously in Australia.26 In
that effort, both old and new products were available simultaneously on grocery shelves. Colgate
considered that the availability of two powder formulations (one appearing to offer more product per
dollar spent) had stretched the transition to concentrated powder over a multi-year period.27 Unilever
looked with some concern to Turkey, where an agreement had been reached in the context of an
industry association about a transition to concentrated product but Procter & Gamble deviated from the
agreement and continued to offer its old product while also introducing the new, compacted
formulation.28
On the other hand, a smaller-scale natural experiment in Australia lent support for the notion that price
competition would not necessarily break out in an “unaligned” product transition. In early 2008,
Unilever moved to offering only compacted liquid laundry detergent, Cussons offered both
concentrated and standard versions of one of its liquid detergents, and Colgate continued offering only
its standard concentration liquids.29 Retail grocery data reflected that Unilever actually gained market
share, and Cussons lost share but did not significantly reduce prices in an attempt to maintain share.30
Indeed, Cussons raised its liquid detergent prices.31 There was no significant price competition for liquid
detergent following this partial transition.32 Thus, the experience of the partial product transition for
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liquid detergent ran counter to the Commission’s claim that the presence in the market of different
detergent formulations would lead to increased price competition.
Colgate and Unilever each considered that the transition to ultra-concentrate laundry detergent in the
United States provided a roadmap to a smooth and profitable transition.33 Walmart was credited with
leading the American transition effort by educating consumers that packages of concentrated detergent
cost the same on a per-wash basis as the old, larger boxes.34 Moreover, Walmart specified a date
beyond which it would no longer carry the old product on its shelves.35 Where Walmart led, the rest of
detergent supply in the US followed, and the transition to ultra concentrate detergents in the US was
considered to have been accomplished in a short time and with minimal consumer confusion.
Once-per-year “Major Category Reviews” in grocery stores
The role of retailers in accommodating product line transitions is important for understanding how the
transition might play out with or without an illegal arrangement to coordinate behaviour.
Woolworths and Coles both had processes by which new product lines were introduced according to a
predictable schedule of one major and one minor “category review” per year.36 For major reviews,
retailers would reconsider the entire range of product offerings and potentially make broad changes to
the category.37 Minor reviews involved modest product changes with minimal in-store impact.38 If a
supplier did not meet a retailer’s schedule for a major review, then it likely would be unable to change
significantly its range of products until the next major review, a year later.39 Woolworths and Coles
category reviews generally started and finished at the same time. Once Woolworths set category review
dates, typically six to twelve months in advance, it rarely moved them.
Sweeping changes of category stock keeping units, as was contemplated for concentrated laundry
detergent, were rare events. They involved significant effort and expenditure by retailers and the
potential for considerable disruption in the stores. New “planograms” – detailed drawings of shelf space
allotments for each product and stock keeping unit – were drawn for every store configuration, and new
shelving to accommodate the new pack sizes was purchased for installation at the changeover date.
For economic reasons, the major retailers would not have wanted a situation in which some suppliers
introduced concentrated detergent while others deliberately delayed the introduction. If suppliers
transitioned in a staggered fashion, retailers’ would need to expend incremental effort and money for
each product line change.40 Additional planogram revisions, new shelving, and new communications to
customers would be necessary for each product line changeover. The need to accommodate different
33
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box sizes in stores and warehouses would also add to retailers’ costs. In short, there were significant
economies from retailers transitioning all suppliers’ detergent lines at the same time.41 For some of the
same reasons, retailers would prefer that each supplier switch its entire product line to the new
concentration levels rather than offering old and new concentrations or pack sizes among the suppliers’
brands.
The retailers’ practice of conducting one major category review per year bore on the timing and the
simultaneity of the transition to concentrated detergent. Two of the suppliers, but not Cussons, had
technical difficulties maintaining product performance as they eliminated filler. This caused them either
to request or to be amenable to a modest deferral of the major category review date. The willingness of
the suppliers and Woolworths to agree to a transition date three weeks later than Woolworths originally
planned was a major element of the ACCC’s allegations of coordinated behaviour.
IV.

Communication Among Industry Participants

Two types of meetings occurred in relation to the transition to concentrated powder detergents. The
first were meetings in which all the major suppliers were present, occurring under the umbrella of the
trade association, Accord. Accord circulated written communications to all detergent suppliers in
relation to its meetings. The second type of meetings were bilateral ones in which Woolworths met
with detergent suppliers individually to discuss transition plans and logistics. Woolworths also
communicated via email to individual suppliers and sometimes to multiple suppliers simultaneously.
Trade association meetings
In March 2008, Colgate presented a proposal to Accord suggesting that the industry body enable a
voluntary, industry-wide and non-partisan “sustainability initiative” in relation to higher concentration
laundry detergent formulas across Australia and New Zealand.42 Colgate subsequently prepared and
presented to Accord a written proposal that included the notion of a voluntary agreement (including all
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers) for a full category transition to ultra concentrates by an
agreed date in 2009 led by an industry body such as Accord. Other key terms included an agreement on
the definition of sustainable concentration, and a compliance logo that would indicate when a product
met agreed standards of concentration.
In April 2008 Accord circulated the Colgate sustainability initiative proposal, without attribution, to
detergent suppliers including the three largest, Colgate, Unilever, and Cussons.43 A meeting of suppliers
and Accord occurred to discuss the Colgate proposal shortly after it was circulated. The participants
agreed that any eventual agreement would need to be cleared by both Accord lawyers and the ACCC.
The ACCC alleged that, from the time the Accord proposal was circulated and Accord held the meeting
to discuss the proposal, the suppliers reached an agreement in principle in relation to the transition to
concentrated detergent, in particular that reformulation would be to 2x concentration and that the
41
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transition would occur in early 2009.44 However, the judge concluded that the evidence did not
establish that there was any agreement concerning these issues.45
The next Accord-supplier meeting occurred in August 2008.46 Acting on legal advice, Cussons refused to
agree to any complete transition to detergent of a specific concentration on a specific date. This was
the beginning of the end of any potential formal coordination through Accord, although the ACCC
argued that the essential elements for the terms of an agreement had been planted. The final nail in the
coffin for any action by Accord occurred at an October 2008 meeting at which Colgate withdrew support
for the notion of an industry-wide labelling proposal.47
Woolworths as Walmart
Past detergent product transitions in Australia and the US led Colgate to conclude that the transition
would be accomplished significantly more quickly, with more of the attendant cost-savings realised
sooner, if there was an industry-wide hard cutover to the higher-concentration products. Early internal
Colgate memos reflected this thinking:
The preferred route is to encourage a paradigm shift towards a total market transition by Jan
2009. Some of this is driven by technical and manufacturing readiness …. We also believe that
it is in the interests of the consumer to present a clear, new Ultra shelf at once without a ‘mixed
shelf’ of Ultra and non-Ultra products. To achieve a category transition we would like to engage
[retailers’] support and leadership.48
… a staged approach is unlikely to work, full changeover is the fastest and best way to
implement and avoid shopper/consumer confusion.49
At a meeting with Woolworths in January 2008, Colgate recommended a full category transition at a
fixed date led by Woolworths, calling this the “Walmart paradigm.”50 Woolworths’ response to Colgate
was that Woolworths was “on the same page” but would not provide retailer leadership in the way that
Walmart did.51 Woolworths’ minutes of the meeting describe its response:
We can’t influence other vendors, we can only mention them [sic] that some vendors go in that
direction. We won’t do anything against vendors who don’t go in that direction.52
Unilever also undertook an effort to persuade Woolworths to direct a hard cutover to concentrated
detergents on a date certain.53 Unilever’s efforts to bring Woolworths on board included a session
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discussing Walmart’s role in the laundry detergent transition during a North American study tour
organised by Unilever and Woolworths.54 But Unilever’s appeal to Woolworths to take on the role filled
by Walmart in the US, like Colgate’s proposal, was declined.55
Ultimately, Woolworths did have a central role in determining that the major detergent suppliers would
transition all their brands in Woolworths stores at a time set by Woolworths. However, this
coordination came after it was clear that all the major suppliers were planning a transition, and Cussons
argued that it was consistent with Woolworths’ long-held practice of staging one major category review
per year. As is discussed below, Woolworths departed from its standard practice when it delayed the
planned in-store transition date by three weeks. This change appears to have been driven primarily by
the fact that Unilever was unable to meet the February in-store deadline due to difficulties
reformulating certain of its brands.56 Colgate may have facilitated Woolworths’ decision to delay by
letting Woolworths know that Colgate could make a smoother transition if given more time.57 For some
weeks, Woolworths resisted moving the category review date, in keeping with its usual resistance to
category review scheduling changes. The ACCC claimed that the major suppliers combined their supplyside market power to impose a three-week delay for the detergent changeover at Woolworths. Absent
this exercise of market power, said the Commission, the product transition would have begun in
February 2009 and, importantly for competitive effects, it would have been drawn out over time and
across brands, resulting in a mix of ultra and standard detergents being on the grocery shelf
simultaneously.
Woolworths planning communications
The rate of communications between Woolworths and suppliers increased from around August 2008,
consistent with the normal window for planning a major category review. Notable examples of
communications from Woolworths in August included an update to Cussons providing some detail about
Unilever’s and Colgate’s thinking about package and scoop size and also an indication that each was
developing 2x concentrations.58 Woolworths also sent a “generic” email to all suppliers indicating an
understanding at Woolworths that all suppliers would be changing over at the category review date and
seeking to confirm that understanding.59 In yet another August email, Woolworths expressed to
suppliers an expectation that there would be parity pricing between old and new product (i.e., the perwash wholesale price would be equal for boxes offering the same number of washes) and announced
that future promotions would need to be fully funded by the detergent suppliers.60 The ACCC claimed
these emails constituted intentional signalling by Woolworths.61
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V.

Expert Economists’ Different Paradigms

The main legal issue was whether the parallel conduct was the result of an arrangement or
understanding among the parties. Given the absence of a “smoking gun,” the issue would have to be
resolved on the basis of circumstantial evidence. In that context, economic evidence often plays a
prominent role and that was true in this case as well.
While the language used in articulating the economic approach is often more technical, the concept is
fairly straightforward. There are essentially two competing hypotheses to explain the parallel conduct.
The first is that the conduct is the result of unlawful conduct – here, an agreement, arrangement or
understanding. The second is that the parallel conduct results from lawful conduct. The applicant (or
plaintiff) wants to argue that the first hypothesis is more plausible than the second; the respondent (or
defendant) wants to argue the opposite. As a general, rule, in most civil law jurisdictions, the burden of
persuasion is on the plaintiff; viz., the agreement hypothesis has to be more plausible than the lawful,
conduct hypothesis, so that all the defendant has to show is that there is an equally plausible hypothesis
involving lawful conduct adequate to explain the conduct.
A few simple examples may illustrate the point. Assume that Melbourne University wants a new
classroom building and puts the project out for bids. Since the construction business has numerous
competitors, there are many bids (say, 10) but they all come back identical to the dollar. The plaintiff’s
basic argument is that this outcome is implausible without hypothesising a prior agreement among the
competitors not to complete and to submit identical bids, or at least that the agreement hypothesis is
far more plausible than the hypothesis that the outcome was the result of lawful, competitive conduct.62
Of course defendants may come up with some context-specific explanation that affects the balance, but
absent that, the plaintiff is likely to succeed.
Contrast the previous example with an alternative. In the week before Christmas, all the holiday-area
hotels and campsites near Barwon Heads increase prices. Of course it is possible they conspired and it is
difficult or impossible in such circumstances to prove a negative. But you don’t need the conspiracy
hypothesis to explain the outcome. It seems more plausible (or at the very least, no less plausible), that
the higher prices are what happens in a competitive market when sharply increased demand comes up
against a relatively fixed supply. So you simply don’t need the conspiracy hypothesis to satisfactorily
explain the outcome.
The key to the process is articulating the competing hypotheses with a sufficient degree of precision to
fit the context of the case. In the detergent case there were two complications. The first is that, under
the statute at the time, illegal conduct could include an agreement, an arrangement or an
understanding and, while these are often ill-defined, it was widely agreed that they are not all the same.
The second complication is that, in contrast to the examples above, no one would have described the
detergent industry in Australia as structurally competitive. The market on the supply side was highly
concentrated with three major suppliers. Moreover it was highly concentrated on the buying side as
well, with Coles and Woolworths being the dominant buyers. In addition, the industry was mature with
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the same suppliers and the same buyers having played their respective roles for some period of time
prior to the alleged unlawful behaviour.
These issues were addressed by the economic experts, Professor Philip Williams for the ACCC and
Professor George Hay for Cussons, but they chose different ways to frame the competing hypotheses.
Each economist specified that one hypothesis was that the parties were acting pursuant to an unlawful
agreement, arrangement or understanding. Professor Williams framed the competing hypothesis as
was whether the actions of the detergent suppliers and Woolworths were consistent with a notion of
unilateral profit-maximising behaviour, but, as we will discuss, with a very narrow view of what counted
as “unilateral.” Professor Hay, on the other hand, framed the competing hypothesis as whether the
parties were acting unilaterally and lawfully in an oligopolistic and therefore interdependent
environment.
Characterizations of interdependence and unilateral behaviour
Both economists agreed that in an oligopoly firms recognise their interdependence. That is, firms
recognise that economic outcomes in the market depend not only on their own actions, but also on the
actions of their competitors.63 In addition, both experts agreed that in concentrated markets where
firms interact repeatedly over time, they learn about rival firms’ behaviour in the marketplace. Through
this mechanism, firms’ unilateral behaviour may become coordinated without the firms entering into an
agreement, arrangement or understanding that the courts would find to be illegal. Economists describe
this outcome as conscious parallelism or tacit collusion. The experts agreed that in a setting with
conscious parallelism or tacit collusion, rivals might unilaterally react to their competitors’ market
behaviour without any words being conveyed between the parties and that this behaviour would not be
proscribed by antitrust laws.64 However, when the economic experts turned to describe the unilateral
behaviour they would envision in a hypothetical setting without anticompetitive communication, their
views differed sharply.
Professor Williams’ concept of unilateral behaviour was distinguished by an absence of any
communication among players in the marketplace.65 This “no communication” standard excluded even
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conscious parallelism or tacit collusion and would preclude, for example, the suppliers learning even
benign market intelligence as they worked with Woolworths to plan for the detergent transition.66
Professor Hay’s standard for “unilateral” behaviour disallowed only illegal communications among
market participants.67 He asked whether actions taken by the suppliers and/or Woolworths were
consistent with their independent economic incentives in a mature oligopolistic market with the kinds of
information flows that one would expect in such a setting. As Professor Hay noted, while his test could
not disprove the existence of collusive behaviour, it could test the validity of a competing theory of
lawful behaviour.68
The judge found that there was no evidence supporting the notion that the counterfactual world that
Professor Williams was asked to assume would have existed in the absence of the Aligned Transition
Arrangement.
Indeed, the evidence relied on by the Commission suggested that indirect and implicit
communications and other forms of “coordinated interaction”, which did not without more
constitute or comprise the proscribed arrangements or understandings, were, and were likely to
continue to be, commonplace in the laundry detergent market. …. It was, for example, highly
likely that in the counterfactual world, each of the Suppliers would continue to have the
incentive and means to seek out and obtain market intelligence from the major retailers,
Woolworths and Coles, about the plans and decisions of their competitors. The counterfactual
world that Professor Williams was asked to assume permitted no such forms of indirect
communication or coordinated interaction. It was, in that respect, artificial and unrealistic.69
The judge observed that, even if Professor Williams’ counterfactual was anchored in economic models
as the ACCC claimed, that “does not mean that it was a relevant or appropriate counterfactual.”70 The
suppliers were “never likely to operate in a hermetically sealed chamber.”71
[Professor Williams’] opinions left open the possibility that the simultaneous transition and
cessation of the supply of standard concentrates in March 2009 was the result of direct or
indirect communications between the Suppliers of a sort that could not be characterised as an
66
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agreement, arrangement or understanding. His opinions left open the possibility that the
parallel conduct was the product of, for example, market intelligence obtained from
Woolworths and Coles, or the Suppliers otherwise unintentionally signalling their plans and
progress via their discussions with the retailers.72
The focus then of the economic analysis was Professor Hay’s contention that the parties’ conduct (or at
least that of Cussons) could be satisfactorily viewed as consistent with unilateral profit-maximising
behaviour in the context of a mature oligopoly. In that sense it would not be necessary to hypothesise
an agreement, arrangement or understanding to explain the observed conduct.
VI.

Economic Analysis Addressing the Two Central Questions
The change in the transition date – evidence bearing on Woolworths’ independent incentives

The importance of the precise definition of unilaterally rational behaviour is illustrated by the
economists’ approach to the question of the timing of the detergent transition in the retail stores. This
was one of the two key questions before the judge. Professor Williams considered that, because
Woolworths strongly wished to adhere to its scheduled date for the detergent changeover to avoid
knock-on effects for other category reviews, the change of the in-store review date from February to
March 2009 was more likely due to some form of coordinated conduct between the major detergent
suppliers to influence Woolworths than due to unilateral conduct by the suppliers.73 Professor Hay
considered that the delay was consistent with a rational outcome of independent behaviour informed
by lawful communications.
As discussed above, Woolworths declined invitations from Colgate and Unilever to direct a detergent
transition in the “Walmart style.” Nonetheless, by virtue of a need to coordinate the product line
changes in its stores, Woolworths eventually took on a de facto coordinating role. Woolworths had
strong unilateral incentives to conduct a single product changeover and thereby minimise costs and instore disruptions. This logic had been institutionalised in the grocery retail business, with major product
line changes occurring only once per year for the laundry category. Because major category reviews
could be disruptive in stores, Woolworths coordinated them carefully across all categories. Changing a
major review date was a rare occurrence.
Woolworths’ central role in the supply chain required the communication of information to suppliers,
with increasing frequency and detail as the time approached for nailing down plans.74 These
communications mostly took the form of bilateral meetings or emails between Woolworths and a single
supplier. Sometimes in these communications Woolworths would inform a supplier of other suppliers’
72
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plans in broad terms. For example, as concerned suppliers’ preparedness, Woolworths told Unilever
that Unilever’s plans were too conceptual compared to its major competitor and likewise told Colgate
that Colgate was better prepared than its competition.75 In this way, a supplier might learn how its own
readiness to introduce ultra detergents compared to the readiness of the other major suppliers.
Woolworths also occasionally sent emails to a broad group of detergent suppliers with summary
references as to when and how the planned transition would take place.76
In August 2008 Unilever determined that it would not be ready to transition all its detergents by the
February 2009 laundry launch date originally set by Woolworths. An internal Unilever email stressed
that it wasn’t a question of resources, there simply was not enough time.77 Colgate was having some
technical difficulties of its own, and welcomed more slack in the launch schedule for a smoother
execution of the transition.78 Cussons appeared to be the supplier best prepared for a February 2009
launch of ultra detergents and it did not appear to engage in discussions about moving the launch date,
except to try to clarify the retailers’ expected timing.79
During the month of August 2008, Unilever and Colgate each let Woolworths know that their firm would
be able to more completely and successfully transition to ultra concentrated detergent if the transition
date could be delayed until March. The Woolworths Business Manager directing the transition was
unwilling to change the scheduled launch date and told both Unilever and Colgate that any products
that could not be compacted to ultra concentration would be “de-ranged,” that is, not carried on store
shelves.80 Unilever and Colgate each took the discussion of the launch date to the Business Manager’s
superiors, who backed the Manager but remained open to discussion with each supplier. Woolworths
finalised the delayed launch date of March 2 2009 and communicated it to Unilever and Colgate at the
end of August 2008.81 Cussons learned of Woolworths’ decision a number of weeks after Colgate and
Unilever.82
In the background of Unilever’s and Colgate’s bilateral discussions with Woolworths, an internal
Unilever email in mid-August said “I believe we require a joint approach from all manufacturers in order
to push for a delay to March.”83 It did appear that Colgate and Unilever were aware of a common
preference for a delayed transition date and used this argument in their attempts to sway
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Woolworths.84 Whether Unilever and Colgate formed their beliefs based on information shared by
Woolworths or on conversations between employees of the two firms was not a topic of inquiry
addressed by the judge, though it is not clear that either mechanism would be allowed under Professor
Williams’ definition of unilateral behaviour.
Professor Williams did not discuss that Colgate’s preference for a delay may have been for technical
reasons similar to, if more muted than, Unilever’s reasons. Without recognition of Colgate’s compacting
challenges and with a narrow characterization of unilateral behaviour, Professor Williams concluded
that some coordinated conduct among Unilever, Colgate and Cussons most likely shifted the balance of
bargaining power away from Woolworths and caused Woolworths to agree to delay the launch date.85
Professor Hay allowed the possibility of lawful communications between firms in his hypothetical world.
Thus, upon learning of the technical difficulties that Unilever in particular was having, Woolworths
would have been open to exploring with Colgate and Cussons the possibility of a later date. In doing so,
Woolworths would have learned that Colgate considered that its own transition would be smoother
with more slack in the launch schedule. Woolworths would have known that staggered product
introductions would raise Woolworths’ storage and logistics costs, require duplicative transition costs at
a later date, and impede clear communication to consumers about the benefit of the transition.
Professor Hay concluded that, choosing between an on-schedule but incomplete transition or a delayed
full transition, Woolworths would have unilaterally chosen to delay by three weeks.
The judge concluded that with lawfully gained information about timing issues for Unilever and Colgate,
it could be economically and independently rational for Woolworths to delay the launch date until a
time when the change could be made for all suppliers at once.86 Further, the judge concluded that
“[w]hatever information may have been conveyed to Woolworths by Unilever in relation to the
preferences of the Suppliers, there is no evidence that Woolworths treated it as an exercise of the
combined bargaining power of the suppliers.”87
Other evidence from contemporaneous documents and from testimony was relevant to the question of
whether Cussons had entered into any arrangement or understanding to delay the launch date. That
evidence, according to the judge, showed Cussons was aware that Woolworths was in discussions
regarding the possibility of a date being moved but was not an active participant in those discussions.88
While Unilever and Colgate pressed for a delay, it appeared that Cussons was less concerned and waited
for directives from Woolworths.89 In fact, Cussons was unsure of Woolworths’ decision on timing until a
number of weeks after Woolworths had informed Unilever and Colgate that the in-store launch date
would be delayed a few weeks, to March 2009. The judge concluded that there was no evidence that
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Cussons engaged in any coordinated conduct that was intended to, or did, cause Woolworths to weaken
and agree to delay the launch date.90
Full or partial transition – evidence bearing on the prisoner’s dilemma question
The second prong of the ACCC’s complaint concerned the fact that all the major suppliers transitioned
sharply from standard to concentrated powder detergent at the category review date. On this question,
the source of the difference between the economists was primarily a difference in the interpretation of
the economic evidence.
According to Professor Williams, the major detergent suppliers faced what economists call a “prisoner’s
dilemma.” In general terms, the firms would be better off individually and collectively if they could
coordinate their behaviour, but, in the absence of an ability to commit to a coordinated plan, the best
feasible outcome for each supplier would be to follow a different strategy than the more profitable
coordinated one. In the context of the laundry detergent transition, cost-savings from eliminating costly
filler would be maximised and the risk of losing market share minimised for each supplier if all three
could commit to fully transitioning simultaneously to the same new level of detergent concentration.
This would be the best possible outcome for all three suppliers individually and collectively. Professor
Williams claimed that an individual supplier acting alone would be uncertain about the actions its rivals
might take and would choose to maximise its expected profits by continuing to offer at least some
standard formulation detergent to customers who were resistant to change or failed to understand the
value proposition of the ultra detergent. Therefore, in the absence of an ability to commit to an
agreement, arrangement, or understanding, each supplier would rationally and unilaterally choose
either to delay its transition or to offer both standard and 2x concentrated detergent. The outcome of
this independent behaviour would be less profitable than a coordinated outcome for the suppliers, both
individually and as a group. Further, under the ACCC’s theory, the uncoordinated outcome would be
made even worse by new price competition arising due to the availability of both old and new detergent
formulations on grocery store shelves. Professor Williams alleged that it was the wish to avoid the less
profitable outcome associated with suppliers transitioning incompletely or not at all that led the
detergent suppliers to reach an arrangement or understanding to each fully transition each detergent
brand to a 2x concentrated formulation at the same time.
Unsurprisingly, the documents and evidence at trial reflected that each of the three major suppliers
recognised that the ultimate market outcome depended on not only its own transition strategy but also
that of its rivals. Each supplier considered that a supplier that continued to offer standard detergent
while its rivals transitioned fully to 2x concentrated formulations might gain some additional market
share, at least in the short run.91 But documents related to decision-making by Colgate and Unilever
also reflected that these two suppliers calculated that they had economic incentives to proceed with a
full transition to concentrated detergent regardless of what their rivals might do. This was due to the
very large per-unit cost savings from supplying concentrated detergent and the very thin margins
90
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earned on sales of standard detergent.92 The gains from selling concentrated detergent would more
than offset any reasonably foreseeable sales lost to a competitor or competitors still offering standard
detergent.93 Colgate and Unilever each ranked the three relevant outcomes, from most to least
profitable, as follows: transition fully while other suppliers also transition fully, transition fully while one
or more rival suppliers do not transition fully, transition partially.94
Professor Hay concluded that neither Colgate nor Unilever faced what would be considered a prisoner’s
dilemma situation. For them, the strategy of a complete transition would have been profit-maximizing
whether through coordinated or independent behaviour. On his reading of the evidence, Unilever and
Colgate would proceed with as full a transition as soon was technically feasible even in the absence of
an arrangement or understanding to coordinate with other detergent suppliers.95
Cussons conducted internal workshops into June 2008 in which it weighed (in qualitative terms) the risks
and potential payoffs of its own product mix strategy in the face of the range of possible strategies rivals
might adopt. Cussons considered that transitioning only a sub-range of its powders would mitigate the
risk of lost sales but would be unlikely to convert consumers. Moreover, an offering of standard
detergent might be given less shelf space, would confuse messaging to consumers, and might cause
Cussons to miss out on the consumer transition to green products. Thus, over the long run, Cussons
might lose market share by delaying its transition to ultra concentrates relative to the other major
suppliers. A decision by Cussons was never clearly articulated, but the product line decision appears to
have been resolved for the supplier by late July 2008, when Cussons reported internally that retailers
were requiring a complete changeover to ultra concentrated detergent.96
Of course, even a supplier whose independent economic incentive was to transition fully to 2x
concentrated detergent might be still better off if other suppliers would do the same. In this case, even
suppliers with an independent incentive to fully transition might wish to enter an agreement,
arrangement, or understanding that all suppliers would fully transition. As Professor Hay acknowledged
in his report, his analysis could identify whether firms’ behaviour would be any different without an
agreement but it could not prove the non-existence of an agreement, arrangement, or understanding.
Reviewing the evidence describing the detergent suppliers’ and retailers’ views of their independent
economic incentives, the Judge was unconvinced of the ACCC’s claims that it was rational for a Supplier
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acting independently to delay its transition or only partially change its product line and irrational to
transition at the same time as the other Suppliers.
The difficulty with the Commission’s economic irrationality submission, however, is that it
ignores much of the other evidence that suggested that the Suppliers had strong economic and
commercial incentives to transition as early as possible. Those economic incentives, which were
again the subject of Professor Hay’s unchallenged evidence, included the significant costs
savings and the prospect of improved margins from ultra concentrates, the concern at being left
behind if other Suppliers transitioned first, the potential of increased sales if consumers were
persuaded by the benefits of the new products, and the fact that the retailers also saw
considerable economic and commercial benefits in the shift to ultra concentrates and thus were
encouraging that to occur.97
This reasoning led the judge to conclude that in the absence of an agreement, the suppliers would have
transitioned completely, and any agreement would have had no impact on the outcome as it concerned
the hard cut-over to concentrated detergent.
VII.

Prices of Powder Detergent Fell and Volumes Increased After the Transition

The Commission argued that the major detergent suppliers gave effect to the Withhold Supply
Provisions and the Aligned Transition Provisions through 2009. It alleged that, in the absence of these
arrangements, price competition between standard and ultra concentrated laundry detergent would
have led to lower detergent prices. However the magnitude of the price decreases was not specified.
Professor Hay’s analysis of the available data series, commencing 20 months before March 2009 and
extending 16 months after, showed that the average net wholesale price per “factored” kilogram (a
wash load-equivalent quantity) of powder detergent fell 10.4% while the average net wholesale price
per factored litre of liquid detergent fell 4.2%. At the retail level, the average price paid per factored
kilogram of powder detergent fell 6.6% while the average price paid per factored litre of liquid
detergent rose by 1.9%.98 The average monthly factored volume of powder detergent sold at retail
increased 12.0%.99
Professor Williams preferred to compare detergent prices over shorter periods, 12 months before and
after March 2009, but nonetheless reported a 3.0% decrease in the average retail price per factored
kilogram of powdered detergent.100 He did not report the change in the average net wholesale price for
powder detergent.101 The ACCC did not make any claims quantifying how much more detergent prices
would have fallen but for the alleged arrangements.
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The judge observed that had it been necessary to determine whether the alleged coordinated behaviour
caused a significant lessening of competition he would not have found in favour of the Commission.102
VIII.

The Decision

The judge found no evidence of Cussons entering into any agreements over any important elements in
the draft proposals circulated by Accord.103 The judge found that Cussons that did not divulge any
information about its transition plans nor did it attempt to signal its plans, and that Cussons remained
unclear on its rivals’ likely transition plans subsequent to the Accord meetings.104
The judge also rejected allegations that Woolworths acted as the hub to coordinate the adoption of the
Withhold Supply and the Aligned Transition provisions. The judge found the information conveyed and
the timing of communications by Woolworths to be of a routine nature one might expect as the retailer
planned a sweeping change of all the major powder detergent brands it carried. Moreover, he
considered evidence about Cussons’ treatment of information not to support, and sometimes to
contradict, a conclusion that Cussons was participating in a scheme to share information with the
purpose of coordinating behaviour. The judge found that Cussons did not alter its behaviour in light of
information about Unilever and Colgate that was passed along by Woolworths and remained uncertain
about the exact nature of the other suppliers’ plans.105 In addition, though Cussons might have
expected that some information about its own plans might have been shared with the other suppliers,
the judge did not consider that Cussons divulged information strategically.106 The judge concluded that
no one at Cussons appeared to interpret Woolworths’ communications as other than Woolworths
seeking to confirm what it had learned in one-on-one meetings.107
Discussing Woolworths’ role with respect to all the major suppliers, the judge said:
It may generally be accepted that the evidence tended to show that the actions of Woolworths
were important, if not critical, in facilitating or causing what appeared to be a largely
simultaneous full category transition to ultra concentrates by the major suppliers and the major
supermarkets in March 2009. Equally, however, the evidence tended to show that Woolworths
acted as it did mainly because it was in its own commercial interests for that to occur. …. …the
evidence at its highest revealed no more than that Woolworths entered into or arrived at
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separate vertical understandings or arrangements with each of the suppliers in relation to the
transition. ….
The evidence does not establish that the actions of Woolworths, or the dealings between
Woolworths and the Suppliers, and between the Suppliers themselves, gave rise to a horizontal
arrangement or understanding between Cussons and the Suppliers.108
The ACCC appealed the trial judge’s decision claiming, among other things, that the he had set too high
a bar and had maintained a standard of proof necessary to support the inference of an agreement
rather than, at the simplest level, an understanding.109 The Full Court concluded that the trial judge had
not set too high a standard, but rather that the Commission’s case was weak. The Court echoed the trial
judge in observing, that “[p]arallel conduct is often enough consistent with there being an arrangement
or understanding, but by itself is not usually thought to be sufficient to prove such conduct in ordinary
markets.”110 The Full Court reviewed the two shortcomings the judge identified with the Commission’s
case. These were that its expert said only that the parallel conduct would not have occurred if the
parties had operated without communication of any sort, and that there was strong evidence presented
about the economic incentives for market participants to behave as they did even in the absence of an
agreement, arrangement, or understanding.111 The Full Court dismissed the Commission’s appeal.
IX.

How Might “Concerted Practices” Law Apply?

In November 2017 an amendment to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) gave effect to a
new law governing concerted practices undertaken with the purpose, effect, or likely effect of
substantially lessening competition.112 The new law does not define a concerted practice, but the
Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill describes it as encompassing “any form of cooperation between
two or more firms (or people) or conduct that would be likely to establish such cooperation, where this
conduct substitutes, or would be likely to substitute, cooperation in place of the uncertainty of
competition.”113 As before, the new law is not intended to punish parallel conduct that results from
firms acting independently, for example when competition leads firms to meet competitors’ prices.114
Of course, the matter of the industry transition to ultra concentrated detergent in 2009 was not subject
to the new concerted practices law. But it is interesting to consider the judge’s findings through the lens
of the ACCC’s views on the application of the new concerted practices law.
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First, the ACCC has noted that the drafters of the Bill amending the CCA intended, and it is generally held
where such laws exist, that concerted practices include cooperative behaviour or communication that
falls short of a commitment previously required by Australian courts to establish a contract,
arrangement or understanding.115 Second, the ACCC has argued that under the new law it may not be
necessary for a person to alter their behaviour in response to a communication in order to demonstrate
that they are engaging in a concerted practice.116 Third, the Commission has observed that “a concerted
practice may arise from a single instance of information being provided,”117 and that “[i]t may not be
necessary to identify specific communications to establish the existence of a concerted practice. For
example, it may be possible to infer that a specific outcome or behaviour was only possible as a result of
communications between parties.”118
Thus, the ACCC likely would claim that if the detergent matter had been tried under the new concerted
practices law, at least three of the judge’s main findings would no longer weigh as heavily in defence of
Cussons’ behaviour. These findings were that: (1) the evidence failed to establish that Cussons had
assumed any obligation, or given any assurance, undertaking, or commitment to the other suppliers in
relation to the matters that were the subject of the alleged Arrangements;119 (2) Cussons’ actions did
not appear to be influenced by what it heard from Woolworths about Unilever and Colgate plans nor did
Cussons appear to expect or intend that it statements to Woolworths would influence Unilever or
Colgate actions;120 and (3) there was no direct or circumstantial evidence of wrongdoing by Cussons in
relation to Accord meetings and communications or dealings with Woolworths or Unilever.121
The correct characterization of legitimate parallel behaviour
We would not necessarily agree with the ACCC’s implication that the outcome would have been
different had the case been tried under the new law. But our main point is to observe that, given the
lower evidentiary standard for establishing the existence of a concerted practice, a finding of legitimate
parallel behaviour would be even more central to the outcome of the Cussons matter under the new
law. A parallel behaviour defence enters at two points in the concerted practices law, as it did under the
prior law. It is an element that weighs in the establishment of whether coordination occurred. In
addition, if coordination is believed to have occurred, the likelihood and characterization of parallel
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behaviour are relevant to the question of the effect or likely effect on competition of the concerted
action, and possibly also to the question of purpose.122
In the detergent matter, the ACCC failed to identify a credible characterization of likely behaviour in the
absence of coordination.123 In part, a weakness of the Commission’s case was that it appealed too
literally to abstract oligopoly modelling that did not adequately reflect the realities of the detergent
supply chain. Perhaps the ACCC was pre-testing an economic theory, one that allows no communication
between competitors, for possible use in future concerted practices cases. If that is so, all that we
learned is that the ACCC’s very high standard for legitimate communication was too high under the old
law.
The decision in the detergent matter highlighted the challenges of successfully applying economic
models to real market settings. The economic analysis of concentrated markets, where concerted
practice charges will be brought, will be highly fact-driven. A very general model of oligopoly may be
too abstract to be of assistance to a court, as was the case in the detergent matter. Once economists
move beyond the simplest models that are the foundation of oligopoly theory, many variants exist, and
care must be taken to adopt a model of behaviour that accommodates key features of the market in
question.124 In the detergent matter, a simpler and more direct analysis of unilateral profit calculations
proved to be of greater assistance to the judge than a generic and abstract oligopoly model.
Equally important, the Commission built its case by ignoring documented economic forces at work in the
detergent business, forces that would predictably engender certain legitimate unilateral behaviour by
detergent suppliers and retailers. The judge also felt that the Commission strained to interpret
contemporaneous statements and documents as evidence of coordinated behaviour where more benign
interpretations were more plausible.
There can be no doubt that in some circumstances evidence of parallel conduct may provide
circumstantial support for the existence of a collusive arrangement or understanding. The
significance or weight to be attached to parallel conduct, however, will depend on all the
particular facts and circumstances in which the parallel conduct occurred, including the features
of the relevant market and the likelihood of such conduct occurring in the absence of an
arrangement or understanding: Air New Zealand at [466]. The problem for the Commission is
that its submissions concerning the circumstantial significance of the parallel conduct that it
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asserts occurred in this case are not supported by its own economic evidence and are
significantly undermined by the unchallenged economic evidence adduced by Cussons.125
Once again, the ACCC may have been pre-testing how readily courts are willing to infer coordination
from circumstantial evidence. Here, it seems that the judge’s conclusions leave some room for doubt
that the courts will aggressively apply concerted practices law in the face of weak evidence.
The chilling effect on efficient behaviour
Even if Cussons might have escaped a finding of liability under concerted practices law, the effect of the
new law is to increase the probability that a firms’ actions will be construed as anticompetitive. For this
reason, upon the adoption of the concerted practices law, lawyers cautioned their clients to review and
to consider curtailing interactions with competitors and other industry players such as occur through
trade associations.126 The ACCC took a dim view of the Accord meetings, some of the detergent
suppliers’ discussions with their retail customers, and with the suppliers acting on information obtained
from their retail customers.
To see the potential for a chilling effect on efficient behaviour from heightened liability risks under the
new law, consider Woolworths’ situation in the transition to ultra concentrated detergent. If it could
not have communicated with its suppliers to find a transition date that worked for all, Woolworths
would have incurred higher costs of stocking two formulations of detergent, or certain brands produced
only in standard formulation would have been dropped from stores and become unavailable to
consumers; Woolworths would have incurred significant additional costs for subsequent product
transitions; and consumers might have been slowed in their adoption of lower cost (and cleaner)
products. In the case of detergent reformulation, the coordination of the vertical supply chain enhanced
logistical efficiency and ultimately lower costs were achieved throughout the supply chain. If firms
worry that efficient coordinated behaviour may be construed as anticompetitive behaviour and lead to
significant financial penalties, the costs of foregone coordination across vertical levels may be high.
Moreover, in the case of detergent, the alleged harm from Woolworth’s coordination was never
established. Contrary to the ACCC’s theory, average prices of concentrated powder detergent fell after
the largely simultaneous and complete changeover. The ACCC failed to demonstrate that consumers
would have seen even lower prices than those that transpired had there been a staggered transition to
concentrated powder detergent.127 Furthermore, the prior experience with a partial liquid detergent
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transition in Australia contradicted the ACCC’s theory that incrementally lower prices would necessarily
have been the result of a staggered introduction of new products.
In sum, in the detergent matter, fears of running afoul of a too-narrow interpretation of legitimate
parallel behaviour might have imposed costs on firms and consumers without a likely offsetting benefit.
The chilling effect of an increased probability of false positives in the face of the lower evidentiary
standards of the concerted practices law may sometimes result in economic costs for the Australian
economy and consumers.
X.

Conclusion

The decision in the detergent matter highlighted elements that are important to a credible
characterization of legitimate parallel behaviour. First, to be useful to a judge, an economic model
cannot be so abstract as to be divorced from realities of the marketplace. Second, a valid analysis will
be consistent with an objective interpretation of documents and empirical evidence. The case also
highlights that the manner in which concerted practices law is interpreted by the ACCC and the courts
could have important implications for Australian businesses and consumers.
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